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Resumen
El artículo presenta inicialmente una breve revisión de la evidencia empírica, donde se indica que la
tasa de crecimiento económico desde 1965 ha tenido una relación inversa con la abundancia de
recursos naturales o la intensidad en el uso de los mismos. En este sentido, el presenta trabajo
propone una nueva relación entre recursos naturales y el crecimiento económico, a través del ahorro
y de la inversión. Cuando la participación de los propietarios de recursos naturales en el producto
nacional se eleva, la demanda por bienes de capital disminuye y ello conduce a tasas de interés mas
bajas y a una  desaceleración en la tasa de crecimiento. Además, el análisis muestra que la
discrepancia entre las tasas social y privada de crecimiento óptimo aumenta con la participación del
capital natural. La evidencia empírica para 85 países durante el periodo 1965-88 sugiere que el
capital natural no sólo estaría desplazando al capital físico y humano sino que también estaría
inhibiendo el crecimiento económico. Estos resultados sugieren que la fuerte dependencia de
recursos naturales perjudicaría tanto al ahorro como a la inversión de manera indirecta, a través de
una desaceleración del desarrollo en el sistema financiero.
Abstract
This paper begins by a brief review of empirical evidence that seems to indicate that economic
growth since 1965 has varied inversely with natural resource abundance or intensity across
countries. The paper then proposes a new linkage between natural resources and economic growth,
through saving and investment. When the share of output that accrues to the owners of natural
resources rises, the demand for capital falls and this leads to lower real interest rates and less rapid
growth. Moreover, the analysis shows that the discrepancy between the privately and socially
optimal rates of growth increases with the natural capital share. Empirical evidence from 85
countries from 1965 to 1998 suggests that natural capital may on average crowd out physical as
well as human capital, thereby inhibiting economic growth. The results also suggest that, across
countries, heavy dependence on natural resources may hurt saving and investment indirectly by
slowing down the development of the financial system.
____________________
The authors are indebted to Rögnvaldur Hannesson, Ron Smith and two referees for helpful comments and
suggestions.
E-mails: gylfason@hi.is ; gzoega@econ.bbk.ac.uk.  1
1. Introduction 
Natural resources are an important source of national wealth around the world. Yet, 
experience shows that natural riches are neither necessary nor sufficient for economic 
prosperity and progress. The world’s richest countries include Hong Kong, Japan, 
Singapore and Switzerland which do not owe their national wealth to nature and many 
others, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where natural resources 
nowadays play only a minor role in the generation of national income.   
Among developing countries, natural resources are relatively more prevalent. This 
may to some extent reflect their underdevelopment: the modest size of the modern 
sector of the economy makes agriculture and other natural-resource-based economic 
activity relatively more important. But there are also clear  examples of countries that 
are genuinely rich in terms of natural resources but still have not been able to sustain 
economic growth. It thus appears that the generosity of nature may sometimes – 
although by no means always  – turn out to be a mixed blessing. Take Botswana and 
Sierra Leone, both of which produce diamonds for export. By and large, Botswana 
has managed the revenue and rent stream from its main natural resource in ways that 
have contributed to impressive economic growth since independence in 196 6 – in 
fact, the world’s highest recorded rate of growth of gross national product (GNP) per 
capita from 1965 to 1998, even if it slowed down after 1990. Meanwhile, Sierra 
Leone has remained mired in poverty, ravaged by crippling internal warfare as local 
warlords have continued to fight for control over the diamond trade. Sierra Leone was 
the world’s poorest country in 1998 according to the World Bank (2000). Apparently, 
the rich supply of diamonds has turned out to be a source of domestic strife that has 
both diverted precious national resources towards rent seeking of the most destructive 
kind and destroyed the infrastructure and social institutions that are so important for 
economic life. This example shows that the existence of natural resources can be  both 
a blessing and a curse to economic growth and development.  
In this paper, we consider the interaction between institutions, natural resource 
dependence and economic growth. In particular, we are interested in the possible 
mechanisms through which nat ural resources can stifle capital accumulation and 
growth and the conditions under which economic growth can take place in the 
presence of abundant natural resources. In this context it will be interesting to 
consider the experience of those countries – if any – which at some point in the past   2
relied on nature’s bounty but now enjoy the benefits of developed and diversified 
manufacturing and service industries.   
Recent empirical research suggests that an abundance of natural resources can hurt 
economic growth indirectly by unleashing forces that hamper the development of the 
national economy, primarily through the Dutch disease, rent seeking and neglect of 
education. We will review this literature below, in Section 3. To some, these findings 
may seem counterintuitive for it should, in principle, be possible to harness natural 
resources without hurting national economic welfare and growth. We concur.  
This paper is intended to make two main points. First, natural resource intensity 
may under certain conditions blunt incentives to save and invest and thereby reduce 
economic growth. We demonstrate this proposition by deriving the optimal saving 
rate in an endogenous growth model of an economy with natural resources and then 
subject it to empirical tests in a cross-sectional sample of 85 countries from 1965 to 
1998. Second, on the premise that mature institutions contribute to an efficient use of 
resources, including natural resources, and that poorly developed institutions do not, 
we argue that natural resource abundance may also under certain conditions  – to be 
specified – retard the development of financial institutions in particular and hence 
hamper saving, investment and economic growth through that channel as well.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 looks briefly at the empirical evidence on 
natural resource dependence and economic growth. Section 3 provides a brief 
overview of recent literature on the subject. In Section 4, we compare the experience 
of Norway, the world’s most successful oil exporter, with that of other oil-producing 
countries. In Section 5, we derive our main proposition that natural resource 
dependence tends to blunt incentives to save and invest. We also distinguish between 
the quantity and quality of investment. In Section 6, we summa rize the data through 
simple bivariate correlations between natural resource dependence, different measures 
of saving and investment and economic growth. In Section 7, we then proceed to 
more elaborate tests of our hypothesis by multiple regression analysi s in the spirit of 
the recent empirical growth literature. Section 8 summarizes our main results and 
offers a few concluding comments.  
   3
2. Preview 
A rapidly expanding body of research has attempted to discern empirical growth 
relationships across countries. While aggregative and simple, such cross -sectional and 
panel data sets – often covering large numbers of countries – do provide an interesting 
starting point.  
Figure 1 is representative of one of the empirical findings that have emerged from 
some recent studies, beginning with Sachs and Warner (1995). The figure covers 85 
countries, and shows a scatterplot of economic growth per capita from 1965 to 1998 
and natural resource dependence as measured by the share of natural capital in 
national wealth in 1994 – i.e., the share of natural capital in total capital, which 
comprises physical, human and natural capital (but not social capital; see World Bank, 
1997). The natural capital variable used here is close to the source: it is intended to 
come closer to a direct measurement of the intensity of natural resources across 
countries than the various proxies that have been used in earlier studies, mainly the 
share of primary (i.e., nonmanufacturing) exports in total exports or in gross domestic 
product (GDP) and the share of the primary sector in employment or the labor force.
1 
The latter proxies may be prone to bias due to product and labor market distortions. 
The growth rate has been adjusted for initial income: the variable on the vertical axis 
is that part of economic growth that is not explained by the country’s initial stage of 
development, obtained from a regression of growth during 1965-1998 on initial GNP 
per capita (i.e., in 1965) as well as natural capital. When we also purge the natural 
capital share of that part which is explained by the country’s initial stage of 
development, we get very similar results as in Figure 1.  The 85 countries in the 
sample are represented by one observation each for each variable under study, an 
average for the entire sample period, 1965-1998 (see Table 1 and Appendix).
2  
                                                 
1 Alas, 1994 is the only year for which the World Bank has as yet produced data on natural capital, for 
92 countries. In most cases, however, natural capital in 1994 is probably a pretty good proxy for natural 
resource abundance in the period under review, 1965-1998. There are exceptions, true, such as 
Malaysia, Mauritius and Mexico, where the share of primary exports in merchandise exports decreased 
dramatically from 1965 to 1998 as a result of economic diversification away from primary production. 
Even so, all the empirical results reported in this paper can be reproduced without significant deviations 
by using the average primary export share during 1965 -1998 rather than natural capital in 1994 as a 
proxy for natural resource abundance, and also by measuring growth in terms of GNP per worker rather 
than GNP per capita.  
2 The reason why there are 85 countries in the sample and not 92 is that (a) for five countries for which 
estimates of natural capital exist, there are missing data on economic growth since 1965 (Bolivia, 
Germany, Tanzania, Uganda and Vietnam) and (b) for two countries, the available data are problematic 
(Lesotho and Saudi-Arabia). Specifically,  Lesotho is omitted because of its extremely low recorded 
genuine saving rate (-55 percent of GDP), and Saudi-Arabia is omitted because of extreme fluctuations   4
The regression line through the scatterplot in Figure 1 suggests that an increase of 
about eight or nine percentage points in the natural capital share from one country to 
another is associated with a decrease in per capita growth by one percentage point per 
year on average.
3 The relationship is also significant in a statistical sense (Spearman’s 
r = -0.64), and conforms to the partial correlations that have been reported in multiple 
regression analyses where other relevant determinants of growth (investment, 
education, etc., as well as initial income) are taken into account.
4 A similar 
relationship has been reported in a number of recent studies, including Sachs and 
Warner (1995, 1999), Gylfason and Herbertsson (2001), and Gylfason, Herbertsson 
and Zoega (1999).  
We are aware that the study of bivariate cross-sectional relationships has many 
shortcomings. For one thing, such studies bypass the diversity of individual country 
experiences as well as intranation al developments over time. For another, they do not 
distinguish cause from effect. We intend the correlations presented in this paper 
merely to describe the data in ways that are consistent with the results of multiple 
regression analysis that can help acc ount for more potential sources of growth.  
The classification of all 85 countries is presented in Table 1. The table indicates 
that good growth performance appears incompatible with a share of natural resources 
in excess of 15 percent of national wealth. More generally, in line with Figure 1, the 
countries in our sample appear to be concentrated on the diagonal linking the south -
west and the north-east corners of the table. There are also quite a few countries above 
the diagonal, with slow economic growth and a small endowment of natural 
resources, including several countries in Central and South America and the 
Caribbean. Perhaps more interestingly, we detect two distinct groups of countries in 
Figure 1 and Table 1. The first group consists of eight Africa n countries (Central 
African Republic, Chad, Guinea -Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and 
                                                                                                                                           
in its recorded average rate of economic growth over long periods. With the exception of the latter two 
countries, no outliers are excluded from the analysis, so that the sample size remains the same, 85, 
throughout the paper.  
3 There is admittedly an element of statistical bias in Figure 1 in that increased investment increases 
physical capital, thereby reducing the share of natural capital in national wealth  and increasing 
economic growth. (The same point can be made about education and human capital.) This bias, 
however, is probably not serious because Figure 1 can be reproduced by using different  measures of 
natural resource abundance, such as the share of the primary sector in the labor force (as in Gylfason, 
Herbertsson and Zoega, 1999) and the share of primary exports in total exports or GDP (as in Sachs 
and Warner, 1999).  
4 The correlation weakens a bit if we confine the regression to the 77 countries where the natural capital 
share is below 0.25, thus leaving out the cluster of eight observations in the southeastern corner of   5
Zambia), all of which depend on natural resources, with natural capital constituting 
more than a quarter of their national wealth, and have experienced ne gative per capita 
growth since 1965. The other group also has eight countries that are relatively 
resource-poor by our measure, but whose economies have grown very rapidly since 
1965 (Botswana
5, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius and Thail and). 
The remaining 69 countries in our sample fall between the two extremes. The fact that 
erstwhile resource-rich countries such as Botswana, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mauritius and Thailand are classified as resource -poor in our sample attests to the 
successful diversification of their economies away from natural resources over the 
years.
6  
The question is bound to arise what makes the eight high-performance economies 
in the second group different from the eight African laggards in the first. A key fac tor 
that distinguishes the two groups is saving and investment. Specifically, the group of 
natural-resource-rich, slow-growth countries shown in the south-west corner of Table 
1 has an average gross saving rate of only 5 percent, ranging from  -2 percent in 
Guinea-Bissau to 19 percent in Zambia, whereas the natural-resource-poor, high-
growth group shown in the north-east corner has an average gross saving rate of 32 
percent, with individual observations clustered in the range between 28 and 35 
percent. A similar pattern emerges when we replace gross domestic saving with gross 
domestic investment. In this case, the group of natural-resource-rich, slow-growth 
countries has an average gross investment rate of 14 percent, ranging from 7 percent 
in Chad to 29 percent in Guinea-Bissau, whereas the natural-resource-poor, high-
growth group has an average gross investment rate of 28 percent, with individual 
observations clustered in the range between 26 and 31 percent. Hence our focus on 
saving and investment in this p aper. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Figure 1, but even so it remains statistically significant (Spearman ’s  r = -0.52).  
5 Botswana’s natural capital share is small as shown in Table 1 because the World Bank does not 
provide an estimate the country’s diamond rent. The inclusion of Botswana in our sample does not 
materially influence any of the empirical resul ts presented in the paper.  
6 In Botswana, agriculture accounted for only 4 percent of GDP in 1998 compared with 11 percent in 
1980. The corresponding figures for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole are 17 percent and 18 percent 
(World Bank, 2000). The decline in the share of agriculture in Botswana’s GDP since 1980 is a sign of 
diversification as well as drought. But see footnote 5.    6
Table 1. Natural resource dependence and economic growth  
     











£  -1% 
-1%< 
£  0% 
0%<  
£  1% 
1%< 
£  2% 
3%< 
 £  5%  Jordan  El Salvador  

















Mauritius   Korea 
5% < 




















Sri Lanka  
Sweden  






















Paraguay  Canada  Indonesia 
 
15% <  
 £  20% 







Papua New Guinea 
Ecuador 
New Zealand  India   
   
20%<  
 £  25% 
Mauritania 
Rwanda  Cameroon       
   
25%<  
£  30% 
Sierra Leone         
   
30%<  
Central African Rep. 
Chad  





       
   
 
An important limitation of our data is a lack of observations on the share of natural 
resources in national wealth at the beginning of the  sample period. While economic 
growth is measured as an average from 1965 to 1998, our measure of the importance 
of natural resources – their share of total wealth – applies to the year 1994. This may   7
explain, in part, why some formerly resource -dependent countries such as Botswana, 
China, Malaysia, Mauritius and Thailand are counted as relatively resource -poor. The 
pattern in the table can thus conceivably arise through self selection as the good 
performers move towards the upper right-hand corner – having high growth and a low 
share of natural resources in national wealth  – while the poor performers move into 
the bottom left-hand corner – with low or negative growth and heavily dependent on 
natural resources. However, when alternative measures of natural-resource 
dependence – their share of exports, national output, or the labor force – are used at 
the beginning of the period or as period averages, we also find an inverse relationship 
between natural resource intensity and economic growth (see Gylfason, He rbertsson 
and Zoega, 1999, and Gylfason and Herbertsson, 2001).  
 
3. Literature  
Four key linkages between abundant natural resources and economic growth have 
been described in recent literature.  
First, natural resource abundance can lead to the Dutch disease, which can appear 
in several guises. A natural resource boom and the associated surge in raw -material 
exports can drive up the real exchange rate of the currency, thus possibly reducing 
manufacturing and service exports (Corden, 1984). Recurrent booms and busts tend to 
increase exchange rate volatility (Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega, 1999; 
Herbertsson, Skuladottir and Zoega, 1999), thus reducing investment in the tradable 
sector as well as exports and imports of goods and services (see Dixit and Pind yck, 
1994). The Dutch disease can also strike in countries that do not have their own 
currency (e.g., Greenland, which uses the Danish krone; see Paldam, 1997). A boom 
in the primary sector then increases wages in that sector, thereby attracting labor from  
other industries or imposing higher wage costs on them, especially in countries with 
centralized wage bargaining.
7 Through some or all of these channels the Dutch 
disease can reduce total exports relative to GNP (Gylfason, 1999) or at least skew the 
composition of exports away from manufacturing and service exports that may 
contribute more to economic growth.  
This idea accords with the view that technological discoveries and innovation take 
                                                 
7 Herbertsson, Skuladottir and Zoega (1999) provide empirical support for this thesis by showing how 
domestic supply shocks in Iceland – which take the form of changes in the fish catch  – affect real 
wages, not only in the fisheries but in all other sectors as well.    8
place in manufacturing rather than agriculture (see Kaldor, 1966) . To the extent that 
the great productivity improvements that have taken place in agriculture in recent 
decades reflect technological spillovers from other sectors, the Dutch disease may 
slow down economic growth by impeding manufacturing and service expor ts, which 
are probably good for growth (Frankel and Romer, 1999)
8 – not only their quantity 
but their kind and quality as well.
9  
In second place, huge natural resource rents, especially in conjunction with ill -
defined property rights, imperfect or missing  markets and lax legal structures in many 
developing countries and emerging market economies, may create opportunities for 
rent-seeking behavior on a large scale on the part of producers, thus diverting 
resources away from more socially fruitful economic a ctivity (Auty, 2001a, 2001b; 
Gelb, 1988). For example, Tornell and Lane (1998) show that terms of trade windfalls 
and natural resource booms may trigger political interaction, or games, among 
powerful interest groups that result in current account deficits, disproportionate fiscal 
redistribution and reduced growth. The combination of abundant natural resources, 
missing markets and lax legal structures may have quite destructive consequences. In 
extreme cases, civil wars break out – such as Africa’s diamond wars – which not only 
divert factors of production from socially productive uses but also destroy societal 
institutions and the rule of law. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) show empirically how 
natural resources increase the probability of civil war. Moreover,  an abundance of 
natural resources may tempt foreign governments to invade with destructive 
consequences and the possibility of such an event may prompt the domestic 
authorities to spend vast resources on national defense. Military expenditures tend to 
inhibit growth through their adverse effects on capital formation and resource 
allocation (Knight, Loayza and Villaneuva, 1996).   
Rent seeking can also take more subtle forms. For example, governments may be 
tempted to thwart markets by granting favored enterprises or individuals privileged 
access to common-property natural resources, as, for example, in Russia, or they may 
offer tariff protection or other favors to producers at public expense, creating 
competition for such favors among the rent seekers (Krueger, 1974). Extensive rent 
                                                 
8 A dissenting view is expressed in Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000).   
9 In our sample of 85 countries, there is a significa nt negative correlation between the ratio of exports 
to GDP, adjusted for country size based on population, and the share of natural capital in national 
wealth (not shown). There is also a significant positive correlation between the export ratio adjusted  for 
country size and per capita growth adjusted for initial income (not shown).     9
seeking – i.e., seeking to make money from market distortions – can breed corruption 
in business and government, thus distorting the allocation of resources and reducing 
both economic efficiency and social equity (Shleifer and Vis hny, 1993). Empirical 
evidence and economic theory suggest that import protection, cronyism and 
corruption all tend to impede economic efficiency and growth (Bardhan, 1997; 
Mauro, 1995; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1993).   
The question of causality remain s. Clearly, the presence of natural resources is a 
necessary condition for such rent seeking to take place. However, it is by no means 
enough. In principle, natural resources can, of course, coexist with well -defined 
property rights, well-functioning markets and the rule of law in an efficient and 
dynamic market economy. The interesting question from our point of view is whether, 
in practice, natural resource abundance tends to thwart attempts towards establishing 
such a growth-friendly institutional framew ork.  
Third, natural resource abundance may reduce private and public incentives to 
accumulate human capital due to a high level of non -wage income – e.g., dividends, 
social spending, low taxes.
10 Empirical evidence shows that, across countries, school 
enrolment at all levels is inversely related to natural resource abundance, as measured 
by the share of the labor force engaged in primary production (Gylfason, Herbertsson 
and Zoega, 1999). There is also evidence that, across countries, public expenditures 
on education relative to national income, expected years of schooling and secondary -
school enrolment are all inversely related to natural capital as measured here 
(Gylfason, 2001).
11 This matters because more and better education stimulates 
growth. For example, Temple (1999) shows that economic growth varies directly with 
educational attainment across countries once a few outliers have been removed from 
the sample of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), who had found limited support in their 
data for the hypothesis that education is good for growth.  
Again, the question of causality remains. It is likely that economic 
underdevelopment – poverty – causes natural resources to be relatively important and 
                                                 
10 However, the rent stream from abundant natural resources may enable nations to give a high priority 
to education – as in Botswana, for instance. 
11 As far as economic growth is concerned, however, the supply of education may matter less than 
demand (see Birdsall, 1996). This is relevant here because public expenditure on education tends to be 
supply-determined and of mediocre quality, and may thus fail to foster efficiency, eq uality and growth, 
in contrast to private expenditure on education, which is generally demand -led and thus, perhaps, likely 
to be of a higher quality and more conducive to growth. For this reason, we prefer to use secondary-
school enrolment rates rather than public expenditures on education as our measure of education in the 
empirical analysis presented in Sections 6 and 7.     10 
makes it difficult to fund and operate educational establishments. O n the other hand, 
and more interestingly from our point of view, it is also possible that abundant natural 
resources reduce the demand for training and education.  
Fourth, and this point is closely related to the preceding one, abundant natural 
resources may imbue people with a false sense of security and lead governments to 
lose sight of the need for good and growth-friendly economic management, including 
free trade, bureaucratic efficiency, institutional quality and sustainable development 
(Sachs and Warner, 1999; Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999). Put differently, abundant 
natural capital may crowd out social capital in a similar manner as human capital 
(Woolcock, 1998; Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). From this perspective, one reason 
why high inflation tends to hur t economic growth (Bruno and Easterly, 1998; 
Gylfason and Herbertsson, 2001) may be that high inflation reflects flawed policies or 
weak institutions which impede growth. Incentives to create wealth through good 
policies and institutions may wane because o f the relatively effortless ability to extract 
wealth from the soil or the sea. Manna from heaven can be a mixed blessing. 
Unconditional foreign aid may be a case in point (see Burnside and Dollar, 2000).   
 
4. Norway  
It is by no means inevitable that exis ting natural resources prevent the emergence of a 
dynamic economy or that the discovery of such resources acts to dampen an already 
developed economy. Natural resources can be a blessing as well as a curse.   
Norway is a case in point. The world’s second largest oil exporter (after Saudi-
Arabia), Norway shows as yet no clear symptoms of the Dutch disease  – other, 
perhaps, than a stagnant ratio of exports to GDP, albeit at a rather high level, or about 
40 percent of GDP, since before the oil discoveries, indi cating that Norway’s oil 
exports have crowded out non-oil exports krone for krone relative to income; 
moreover, Norway has attracted a relatively limited, yet gradually increasing inflow 
of gross foreign direct investment, equivalent to 8 percent of GDP in  1998 (adjusted 
for purchasing power parity; see World Bank, 2000), far below the figures for Sweden 
and Finland next door (23 percent and 36 percent). Nor does Norway show any signs 
yet of socially damaging rent -seeking behavior even if increasingly loud  calls are 
being voiced – and heard! – for using more of the oil revenue to address domestic 
social needs rather than continue to build up the government-owned oil fund, which is   11 
invested in foreign securities. There are as yet no clear signs either of a fa lse sense of 
security or of an inadequate commitment to education, on the contrary: for example, 
college enrolment rose from 26 percent of each cohort to 62 percent between 1980 
and 1997. Growth has thus far remained stubbornly high. Even so, some observe rs of 
the Norwegian scene have recently expressed concerns that some deep -seated 
structural problems in the country’s education and health care sectors (government 
monopoly, insufficient competition, low efficiency, etc.) may be misdiagnosed as 
financial problems because the money available from the oil fund may blunt the 
willingness of politicians to undertake difficult structural reforms.   
Most other oil-producing countries, including virtually the entire membership of 
OPEC, carry these symptoms to varying degrees. From 1965 to 1998, GNP per capita 
in the OPEC countries decreased on average by 1.3 percent per year. Negative 
economic growth over this 33-year period was accompanied by an average ratio of 
gross domestic fixed investment to GDP of 23 percent for the 11 OPEC countries on 
average, a respectable ratio by world standards (compared with 27 percent in 
Norway). Why did all this investment in the OPEC countries go hand in hand with 
negative growth for so long? – a phenomenon familiar also from the form er Soviet 
block which, under socialism, saved and invested more of its national economic 
output year after year than most OECD countries and yet failed to grow (Easterly and 
Fischer, 1995). The answer must involve the efficiency of investment. For it is no t 
enough to invest; to sustain economic growth, the investments must be of high 
quality. A false sense of security may lull countries with oil in abundance or other 
natural resources into reducing, if not the quantity of investment, then its quality, or 
both. The same argument applies to human capital and perhaps to social capital as 
well.  
One of the factors that separates the different experiences of Norway and the 
OPEC countries, we suggest, is timing. Norway was already a developed country at 
the time of the oil discoveries in the 1970s. Most importantly, Norway’s political and 
social institutions were mature and the economic and financial system was relatively 
developed, although by no means fully liberalized. All of this facilitated judicious and 
far-sighted management of Norway’s oil wealth, at least compared with most other oil 
producers (Hannesson, 2001). In contrast, full-fledged capitalist development did not 
take place in most OPEC countries prior to the discovery of their oil resources, or 
since for that matter (Karl, 1997). While Norway has built up substantial assets   12 
abroad, Saudi-Arabia has accumulated debts.  
It appears from our informal discussion that saving and the quantity and quality of 
investment may be among the key factors that separate those resource-rich countries, 
like Norway, that have grown rapidly from those that have had less success. We now 
turn to the interplay between natural capital and the quantity and quality of investment 
in a theoretical context.  
 
5. Theory  
Our aim in this section is to show how optimal saving, and also the rate of growth of 
output and capital, depends on the intensity of natural resources and the quality of the 
capital stock.  
We take output to be produced by labor L, natural resources N and capital K and 
the production function to be of the Cobb-Douglas variety:  
(1) 
b a b a K N AL Y
- - =
1  
where A represents overall efficiency, including technology and quality (more on this 
in Section 5.3). We can rewrite equation (1) in per capita terms: 
b a bk An y
- - =
1  where 
y = Y/L, n = N/L and k = K/L.  
Equation (1) encapsulates a technology where natural resources can be bundled 
together with either labor or capital in the production process (Bruno, 1984). Imagine 
the production of oil or fish fit for consumption. One way to generate value added Y 
would be to use a lot of raw materials – fish or crude oil – and to sell these 
unprocessed with a minimum input of labor and capital. However, the same value of 
output can be attained with fewer raw materials and more labor or capital to produce a 
more refined good. We need a production function that generates smooth and 
differentiable isoquants in the L -N-K space such as the one given by equation (1).  
We distinguish between the structure of the economy and its abu ndance of natural 
resources. By structure we mean the importance of natural resources to the national 
economy while abundance refers to the supply (per capita) of the natural resources. 
Within the Cobb-Douglas framework, the exponents in the aggregate production 
function (1) denote factor shares – hence the structure of the economy – while the 
factor inputs are absolute quantities. An increase in the parameter  b thus means that 
the economy now relies more heavily on natural resources in producing output  – 
independently of its supply  – while an increase in  N implies that the supply has   13 
increased. The distinction between structure and abundance allows us to distinguish 
between the effect of a change in the factor share b on growth, on one hand, and a 
change in the abundance of the natural resource N, on the other. In Figure 2, we 
describe changes in abundance by horizontal movements, holding the structure of the 
economy unchanged, and structural changes by vertical movements, holding resource 
abundance unchanged.   
 
5.1 Optimal saving in the Solow model 
To set the stage, we start with the Solow model and derive the optimal saving rate in 
an economy with natural resources. Consumption per capita, c = C/Y, is proportional 
to output:  
(2)  ( ) y s c - = 1  
where s = S/Y is the saving rate. In the transition towards a Solovian steady state the 
capital/labor ratio evolves according to 
(3)  g d g
d













where g  is the growth of the labor force and d  is the depreciation rate. We abstract 
from technological progress. In the steady state where  0 / = k k & , the capital-output 
ratio is an increasing function of the saving rate and a decreasing function of the 







   
Solving the normalized version of equation (1) and equation (4) together for y and 
substituting the result into the consumption function (2) gives   
(5)  ( ) b a






















Maximizing consumption per capita in equation (5) with respect to  s gives the 
following simple solution for the optimal saving rate:   
(6)  b a s - - =1    14 
Hence, the greater the role of natural resources in the generation of national output – 
i.e., the greater b in equation (1) – the smaller is the optimal saving rate. Put 
differently, the presence of natural resources – that is, a positive share of natural 
resources in national income – reduces the marginal productivity of capital and 
thereby also the propensity to save. This way, natural capital crowds out physical 
capital. In an economy without natural resources (b = 0), the optimal saving rate in 
equation (6) obviously becomes 1 – a, the golden-rule formula.  
Equations (1), (4) and (6) imply that  
•   The larger the share of natural resources in national income  b, the lower is the 
elasticity of output with respect to the saving rate.
12 When b increases, the 
production function becomes more concave when plotted against capital and a 
given proportional increase in the saving rate raises future output, and hence also 
consumption, less.  
•   Because the elasticity of output with respect to saving is decreasing in  b, the 
optimal saving rate – which maximizes steady -state consumption – is also a 
decreasing function of b. The larger the share of natural resources in national 
income, the lower is the optimal saving rate.  
•   Heavy dependence on natural resources as measured by their share in national 
income b causes the capital-output ratio to be lower due to a lower optimal saving 
rate. In effect, natural capital crowds out physical capital to a degree.  
•   In the long run, the level of output per capita is inversely related to the share of 
natural resources in national output, given the level of natural resources  N, due to 
less saving. However, notice that an increase in their level  – holding their share of 
national income constant – makes output as well as the stock of capital rise. 
•   In contrast, the speed of adjustment towards steady state is an increasing function 
of the share of natural capital in national income  b. The larger the natural capital 
share, the smaller is the share of physical capital in national income and hence the 
more rapid is the adjustment to steady state.
13  
In sum, an economy where the owners of natural resources receive a high fraction of 
national income converges quickly to a stea dy state with a low saving rate and a 
                                                 
12 By equation (5), the elasticity is ( ) ( ) b a b a + - - 1  which is decreasing in  b.  
13 The speed of adjustment is given by ( )( ) d g + - - - ) 1 ( 1 b a  which is increasing in  b. This is the rate 
of decrease of the difference between the current and the steady-state level of capital and is   15 
correspondingly low capital-output ratio and where, most importantly, output per 
capita is also low.  
 
5.2 Optimal saving in the Ramsey model 
Because our derivation of the optimal saving rate in the Solow model does no t 
constitute microeconomic optimization from first principles, we now proceed to 
derive the optimal saving rate in the Ramsey model which is more firmly grounded in 
the optimization behavior of firms and consumers.   
Assume the same production function as in the Solow model above. As before, 
output can be either saved – that is, added to the capital stock – or consumed. Now 
enters the central planner who maximizes the welfare of the representative consumer 
by solving the following optimization problem:   
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where c is consumption per capita as before and r is the pure rate of time preference, 
subject to the constraints  
(8)   00 kk =  
(9)  ( )
1 bab kAnkck dg
-- =--+ &  
where  0 k  is a constant. The necessary conditions that have to be satisfied along an 
optimal path are  
(10)   ( )
c
c b a b
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- - r d 1  
(11)    ( )
1 bab kAnkck dg
-- =--+ &  
Equation (10) is the well-known Keynes-Ramsey rule. The left-hand side shows the 
marginal benefit of saving  – that is, postponing consumption – which is the net 
marginal product of capital and the right-hand side shows the marginal cost which is 
the sum of the pure rate of time preference and the (absolute) rate of growth of 
marginal utility. The higher the net marginal pro duct of capital, the greater is the 
benefit from saving more and the more impatient the representative consumer, the 
                                                                                                                                           
independent of the saving rate. See Romer (1996), page 22.   16 
greater is the cost. Finally, if consumption is expected to grow in the future ( c u &  < 0), 
this constitutes an extra cost of increasing saving: it is costly to postpone consumption 
to a later time when it will be valued less.   
The Keynes-Ramsey rule tells us that changes in factor intensity that increase the 
share of national income going to the owners of natural resources reduce the marginal 
benefit of saving and hence also capital accumulation for all plausible parameter 
values.
14 It follows that an economy whose industries rely heavily on the use of 
natural resources tends to have a relatively low steady-state stock of capital, other 
things being equal. A structural change that makes oil more important relative to 
capital will reduce the optimal saving rate. In contrast, an increase in the natural 
resource base (an oil discovery, for instance) – holding the share of the resource in 
national income constant – causes the marginal benefit of saving to go up and hence 
also its optimal level.  
In steady state we have  0 cc uuk == & &  which implies, after some manipulation of 
equations (10) and (11), that  
















s 1  
This result simplifies to  b a s - - =1  as in equation (6) in the Solow model if g  = r . 
In any case, the optimal rate of saving varies inversely with the share of natural 
resources in national income, b.  
We also find that the speed at which the economy travels along a saddle path 
towards steady state is increasing in the share of the natural resource in national 
income. An increase in the parameter  b makes the production function be more 
concave in capital. As a result, a fall in the stock of capital below its steady -state 
value has a greater effect on its marginal product and hence also on the incentive to 
save and invest. Therefore, saving will increase more and we will move faster back to 
steady state.  
To see how expectations about how permanent a natural resource boom is enter the 
calculations we need to solve the model with the use of a phase diagram (not shown) 
                                                 
14 An increase in b reduces the marginal product of capital as long as  ( ) ( ) log/11 nkab <-- . 
Assuming that a + b = 0.5 as a minimum makes the critical value of the natural capital/physical capital 
ratio equal to  39 . 7 2 » e  which ensures that the above inequality is satisfied for  all countries in our data   17 
and pay close attention to whether it is the structure of the economy – represented by 
the parameter b in the production function – that is changing or the supply of the 
resource N, holding the factor share constant. To make a long story short, the Keynes-
Ramsey rule (10) can be rewritten as the following Euler equation:  
(13)  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] g d
q
+ - - - =






where q  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion  – assuming that the utility function 









) ( c c u t . Equations (11) and (13) can 
now be used to solve the model and derive the following results:   
•   A permanent increase in b – the share of natural capital in national income  – makes 
consumption jump immediately and then gradually decline to a lower level than 
before as the capital stock is gradually depleted. While both investment and output 
are lower in the new steady state, the saving rate – which is the ratio of the two – is 
lower because of the diminishing marginal product of capital.   
•   A transitory increase in b makes consumption jump initially  – albeit not by as 
much as in the case of a permanent change – and subsequently both consumption 
and capital decline until  b comes down again. At exactly that moment we hit the 
old saddle path. Thereafter, consumption and capital gradually increase along the 
old saddle path until we hit the original steady state.   
•   A permanent increase in N (holding b constant) – i.e., holding technology constant 
– makes consumption jump immediately so that we hit a new saddle path after 
which we move upwards along the new path towards a new steady state where 
both the level of consumption and the stock of capital are higher than before. Note 
the interesting twist to this saga: A permanent resource boom – holding the share 
of natural resources in national income constant – raises consumption by more than 
the increased supply of the natural resource would imply. There is a secondary 
effect through capital accumulation. When  N goes up, output increases and so do 
permanent income and consumption, but because the marginal product of capital 
goes up, the incentive to save is enhanced and the capital stock i s gradually 
increased. As a result, steady-state consumption rises by more than the rise in 
income caused by more abundant natural resources.  
                                                                                                                                           
set where Niger has the highest value of n/k, 5.66.    18 
•   A temporary increase in N also causes consumption to jump and then to grow 
gradually alongside the capital stock. However, when the natural resource boom 
comes to an end we hit the old saddle path and both consumption and capital fall as 
we move down the old saddle path (as in Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999). There 
occurs a transitory consumption boom. Importantly, consumption is maintained at 
a higher level than its original steady state for  a period which is longer than the 
duration of the natural resource boom. 
  
5.3 Endogenous growth 
Rather than focus on medium-term growth, we would now like to write down a model 
that shows how economic growth depends on the abundance of natural resources and 
the quality of the capital stock, even in the long run. In particular, we will show how 
natural resources can affect the rate of growth of output and capital both directly 
through the quantity of investment as well as indirectly through the quality of 
investment. Our model of choice is only one of several possible ones; accordingly, its 
implications need scrutiny and testing.   
We adopt the pioneer endogenous growth model of Romer (1986) where 
sustainable growth arises from constant returns to capital at the social level. At the 
firm level, however, we have constant returns to all factors of production and 
diminishing returns to capital. The root of constant social returns to capital  lies in 
learning-by-investing and instantaneous knowledge spillovers across firms.   
We expand the model to include natural resources. We assume that both the 
productivity of labor as well as that of the natural resource is augmented through 
learning and that the level of labor- and natural-resources-augmenting technology can 
be proxied by the aggregate stock of capital, which is a function of past investment; 
hence the generation of knowledge. We assume that the number of workers is fixed. 
This gives us the following production function for the representative firm:  






i i KL KN qK Y
- - =
1  
where Yi denotes the output of the representative firm i and q is the exogenous 
productivity of capital, and takes a value between zero and one. Equation (14) gives 
equation (1) when 
b a b a K q A
+ - - =
1 ,  ￿ =
i
i K K , ￿ =
i
i L L ,  ￿ =
i
i N N  and all firms 
are of equal size.    19 
Like Scott (1989), we distinguish between quantity and quality (see also Lal and 
Myint, 1996, Ch. 2). If some investment projects miss the mark and fail to add 
commensurately to the capital stock, we have q < 1. One way to interpret q is to view 
it as an indicator of distortions in the allocation of installed capital due, perhaps, to a 
poorly developed financi al system, but perhaps also due to trade restrictions or 
government subsidies that attract capital to unproductive uses in protected industries 
or in state-owned enterprises where capital may be less productive than in the private 
sector (Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega, 2001). Another way is to view the quality 
index q as the ratio of the economic cost (i.e., minimum achievable cost) of creating 
new capital to the actual cost of investment (Pritchett, 2000) – that is, K is then 
measured on the basis of actual costs which may overstate its productivity. Yet 
another way is to view q below 1 as a consequence of aging: the larger the share of 
old capital in the capital stock currently in operation, that is, the higher the average 
age of capital in use, the lower is its overall quality (Gylfason and Zoega, 2001).  For 
our purposes, the three interpretations are analytically equivalent. However, we 
assume that the quality of capital has remained constant in the past which means that 
all units of capital are of the same quality. In other words, we are not interested here 
in the implications of having different vintages of capital.   
The other important new element here is the presence of natural resources. 
Whereas capital is owned by a class of capitalists, the natura l resources are owned by 
individuals – the naturalists. The total stock of natural resources is given and hence 
also the supply of their services. We take these services to be fixed and exogenous so 
that no opportunities for intertemporal allocation of these resources arise.  
We assume a perfectly competitive market for the services of natural resources. In 
equilibrium, supply of and demand for natural resources are equalized and the 
marginal product is equal to their real price. Similarly, there is perfect  competition in 
the market for labor and the marginal product of labor is equal to the real wage. 
Finally, we have a market for capital where the owners of the capital sell their 
services to firms. As in the other two factor markets, we have an equilibrium  under 
perfect competition where marginal product equals the sum of the real interest rate  r 
and the rate of depreciation d:  
(15)  ( ) ( ) ( ) d + = - - =










i 1 1                         20 
The depreciation rate d  is the rate at which installed capital loses its usefuln ess 
over time, as a result of economic obsolescence as well as physical wear and tear 
(Scott, 1989). The parameters q and d  could both be modeled as endogenous choice 
parameters (as in Gylfason and Zoega, 2001), but here we treat them as exogenous 
magnitudes for simplicity, even if we acknowledge that depreciation may depend on 
quality, through obsolescence.
15  
Households with an infinite planning horizon maximize discounted future utility 
with respect to consumption per capita and subject to an asset-accumulation 
constraint. This gives the standard Euler equation for the growth of consumption per 
worker: 
(16)  ( ) r s - = r g                                                     
where s  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (assuming constant  relative risk 
aversion) and r  is the rate of time preference. Using equation (16) and assuming 
symmetric equilibrium , we get the following expression for the optimal rate of growth 
of consumption and output: 
(17)  ( ) ( ) r d s - - - - =
- - a b b a L N q b a g
1 1                      
Thus, economic growth depends on several factors:  
•   The rate of growth varies directly with the quality of the capital stock  q. The higher 
quality, the higher is the price of capital  – for a given level of capital  – and hence 
the real rate of interest. A higher interest rate induces consumers to postpone 
consumption – i.e., to save and accumulate capital.  
•   The rate of growth depends on the size of the labor force L. This is the scale effect 
that is common in the growth literature. A larger aggregate labor force raises the 
private marginal product of capital and hence also the price of capital  – the real 
rate of interest. This leads to increased saving and a more rapid rise of 
consumption.  
                                                 
15 We thus view quality and durability as two different things. The pyramids of Egypt were high -
quality investments in their day  – good at preserving mummies! – and they have lasted a long time 
(high q, low d); they remain among Egypt’s major sources of foreign exchange. High-quality 
computers, by contrast, do not last long because they are quickly rendered obsolete by better machines 
(high q, high d). Soviet housing, which sometimes began to crumble even before construction was 
completed, is an example of low-quality, low-durability investment (low  q, high d). But some low-
quality investments last a long time, like Mr. Hoxha’s concrete bunkers, hundreds of thousands of 
them, scattered all across Albania: they were built to last as long as the pyramids, but they remain 
utterly useless, or worse because it would be so costly to demolish them (low q, low d).    21 
•   The rate of growth is inversely related to the pure rate of time preference r. The 
higher the rate of time preference – i.e., the more impatient are workers – the 
greater is current consumption and the slower is the growth of consumption in the 
future due to less saving.  
•   The rate of growth is inversely related to the rate of depreciation d. A “good” 
investment combines high quality and low depreciation. Equation (17) shows that 
“bad” investments retard the build-up of useful capital over time in two ways: (a) 
by adding capital of low quality, with  q below 1, hence lowering the price of 
capital and blunting the incentive to save and invest, and (b)  by increasing the 
depreciation rate d, thus decelerating output from the supply side.  
Most importantly from our perspective, the intensity of natural resources affects the 
rate of growth. Given our assumptions of constant returns to scale and competitive 
markets, the exponents a and b in the production function show the share of output 
going to labor and the naturalists, respectively, so the remainder goes to the 
capitalists. Equation (17) shows that both the share of the naturalists in output b as 
well as the term N
b in the production function affect the growth rate.  
A rise in the supply of natural resources N causes their price to fall while keeping 
the factor share constant at b. However, an increase in the share of output going to the 
owners of the natural resource, b, causes the price to rise while leaving N unchanged 
due to its fixed supply. These changes affect the rate of growth of consumption and 
output: 
•   A rise in the supply of the natural resource N – with an unchanged state of 
technology and hence unchanged factor shares – leads to a fall in its price and an 
increase in the quantity used in production. The increased use of the natural 
resources raises the marginal product of capital, hence also the demand for capital 
and its price – the real rate of interest. A higher real interest rate lowers the price of 
future consumption and makes workers substitute future for current consumption. 
Saving and investment increase and he nce also the pace of learning and knowledge 
spillovers. The rate of economic growth has increased. But notice that this is a 
scale effect similar to the one involving the size of the labor force.   
•   A rise in the share of output going to the owners of the natural resource, b, reduces 
the marginal productivity of capital. This lowers the real rate of interest and raises 
the price of future consumption. Facing a higher price of future consumption,   22 
workers increase current consumption at the expense of future consumption. 
Saving is reduced and so are investment, learning and growth in this closed 
economy. Given competitive markets, the share going to the naturalists can only 
increase due to changes in the production function.
16    
The socially optimal rate of growth of consumption – which comes from the 
solution to the central planner’s problem – depends on the social marginal product of 
capital, not the private marginal product. The rate of growth of consumption and 
output is now given by  
(18)  ( ) r d s - - =
- - a b b a L N q g
1                                      
Notice that the privately optimal growth rate in equation (17) is smaller than the 
socially optimal one in equation (18). The difference lies in the term  1 - a - b in the 
marginal product expression in the former equa tion. As a result, the discrepancy 
between the actual and the optimal rate of growth is increasing in the share of output 
going to the naturalists b. In other words, the extent of the market failure inherent in 
the Romer model varies directly with the shar e of output going to the owners of the 
natural resources. 
 
5.4 Natural capital, financial intermediation and growth 
We have identified a direct link between natural resources and economic growth, 
through saving and investment. There may also be an indirect  effect through the 
productivity of capital q. An abundance of natural resources may hamper the 
emergence of a well-developed financial system. If so, this outcome is likely to result 
in an inefficient allocation of savings across sectors and firms  – that is, reduce the 
value of q in the equations above – and to reduce the average productivity of capital 
and so to further blunt incentives to save and invest by reducing the marginal 
productivity of capital at a given level of the capital stock.   
When a large part of national wealth is stored in a natural resource, renewable or 
not, there is less need for financial intermediation to conduct day -to-day transactions. 
Dissaving can take the form of more rapid depletion of the resource and saving can 
take the form of less rapid depletion or of more rapid renewal in the case of renewable 
                                                 
16 Alternatively, we could have derived the same result assuming imperfect co mpetition and monopoly 
rents in the market for the services of natural resources. Changes in these rents would then affect 
growth.   23 
natural resources. In some countries, such as the oil-rich OPEC states, saving also 
takes the form of deposits in foreign banks. In this case, domestic financial 
intermediation becomes even less important. In contrast, when saving is piled up at 
home in the form of physical capital, domestic banks and stock markets assume 
paramount importance. By linking up domestic savers and investors, the domestic 
financial system contributes to a  more efficient allocation of capital across sectors and 
firms.  
Further, a well-developed financial system helps drive a wedge between the effect 
of foreign and domestic saving on economic growth. In other words, as the financial 
system matures and becomes more efficient at allocating capital at home, foreign 
savings – i.e., deficits on the current account of the balance of payments – become 
relatively less useful when not channeled through the domestic banking system. In a 
mature financial system, investm ent financed through domestic saving can be more 
effective at stimulating economic growth than investment financed by foreign saving.   
Not only is it thus possible for an abundance of natural resources to hamper the 
development of the financial system and  hence to distort the allocation of capital but 
economic growth may slow down due to a detrimental effect of financial 
backwardness on the quantity and quality of saving and investment. King and Levine 
(1993) find that indicators of financial development an d their predetermined 
components predict subsequent growth, physical capital accumulation and 
improvements in the efficiency of capital allocation.
17 Hence, our hypothesis that 
natural resource dependence tends to go along with an underdeveloped financial 
system means, if King and Levine are right, that resource dependence also tends to 
hinder future gains in efficient capital deepening and economic growth.  
 
6. Correlations  
To recapitulate, we posit that heavy dependence on natural resources may reduce 
saving and investment and hence inhibit economic growth. Resource dependence may 
also slow down the development of the financial system, thereby reducing the quality 
of investment decisions and hence also the productivity of capital and also, perhaps, 
raising the ensuing rate of depreciation. If so, a given investment rate is likely to 
generate a lower rate of growth of output, other things being equal.  
                                                 
17 Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) report similar findings.     24 
In empirical research on economic growth thus far, the effects of investment on 
growth have not generally been found to be very strong or highly significant. Many 
researchers, including Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala -i-Martin (2000), do not even 
consider investment as a potential determinant of long -run growth, presumably 
because they view investment, like growth,  as an endogenous variable. Moreover, 
Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001) report that they have found little evidence of a link 
between natural resource abundance and investment. Almost invariably,  the volume 
of gross investment has been used as the sole measure  of investment in such studies, 
with mixed results (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Barro and Sala -i-Martin, 1995). This 
practice means that net investment and replacement investment have been assumed to 
have identical effects on growth. We have pointed out that the higher the fraction of 
gross investment needed to replace old capital, the lower will be the rate of growth of 
output. We now want to take a further step and, as a prelude to the regression analysis 
that follows, study the cross-country correlations among (a) natural resource intensity, 
gross investment and genuine (i.e., quality -adjusted) saving which takes into account 
the depreciation of physical, human and natural capital as well as the stock of foreign 
assets, and (b) investment, saving, and econom ic growth.  
 
6.1 Gross investment and growth 
Before embarking on the regression analysis in Section 7, let us inspect the data. The 
upper panel of Figure 3 shows a scatterplot of the average ratio of gross domestic 
investment to GDP in 1965-1998 and natural resource intensity measured as before. 
When we purge the natural capital share of that part which is explained by the 
country’s initial income per head, we get very similar results as in Figure 3a.
18  The 
group of eight low-growth, natural-resource-rich African countries identified in 
Figure 1 is visible in the lower right -hand corner of Figure 3a. The high-growth, 
natural-resource-poor countries are also easy to spot in the upper left-hand corner of 
the figure. Apart from these two groups, the relationship between the two variables is 
not very clear, even if it remains statistically significant. A clearer relationship 
emerges when we plot economic growth against the investment ratio over the same 
period, 1965-1998. The figure in the lower panel of Figure 3 shows the cross-country 
relationship between the rate of growth, on the one hand, and the sum of domestic and 
                                                 
18 The same applies to Figures 4a, 5a and 6a.   25 
foreign saving (the latter measured by the current account deficit) without any attempt 
to adjust investment for quality, q. The regression line through the 85 observations 
suggests that an increase in the investment ratio by about four percentage points is 
associated with an increase in annual economic growth by 1 percentage point. The 
relationship is significant (Spearman’s r = 0.65).
19  
 
6.2 Genuine saving and growth 
As we saw in Section 5, however, high saving and investment rates do not necessarily 
stimulate growth if they are accompanied by rapid depreciation of physical capital.
20 
Depreciation calls for investment to replace the depleted capita l, thus rendering a 
smaller share of domestic (and foreign) saving available for fresh capital formation. A 
similar argument applies to natural capital. This is where the World Bank’s new 
estimates of genuine saving rates enter the picture (see Appendix fo r a description of 
the data). Countries that run down their stocks of physical and natural capital will 
have low, perhaps even negative, genuine saving rates which, therefore, may be taken 
as a rough indication of the physical and economic durability of th eir capital and the 
sustainability of their natural resource management, at least in a physical sense. For 
example, the average genuine domestic saving rate of the 11 OPEC countries in 1970 -
1998 was -7 percent, ranging from -25 percent in Kuwait to 10 percent in Indonesia, 
compared with 17 percent for Norway.  
Genuine domestic saving differs from net domestic saving (i.e., gross domestic 
saving minus depreciation) by the rundown and depreciation of natural capital, 
adjusted by current expenditure on education, which increases or improves human 
capital
21 even if it is classified as current expenditure in national income accounts. 
Genuine saving is intended to indicate the difference between sustainable net national 
product and consumption, where sustainable net national product means the 
maximum amount that could be consumed without reducing the present value of 
                                                 
19 The slope of the regression line through the scatterplot is consistent with the coefficients on 
investment in cross-country growth regressions reported in recent literature (Levine and Renelt, 1992).  
20 Scott (1989) is of a different opinion. He claims that depreciation reflect s mainly the economic 
obsolescence of capital, and does not necessarily reduce its usefulness. To him, therefore, gross 
investment is the correct measure of capital accumulation in growth research. In his own words, 
“workers … benefit from rising wages whi ch result in appreciation which is omitted from the 
conventional accounts. Were it included, it would offset depreciation on capital assets. It would then be 
clear that net investment for society as a whole is (approximately) equal to gross investment as 
conventionally measured, and not to gross investment minus depreciation.” (p. 92).  
21 But recall the reservations expressed in footnote 11.    26 
national welfare along the optimum path (Hamilton, 2001).
22 Genuine saving rates are 
higher than net saving rates in those countries where improvements  in human capital 
outweigh the deterioration of natural capital, and conversely. In view of these 
adjustments, one might expect genuine saving rates to be more closely correlated with 
natural capital and economic growth than gross investment rates.  
The data seem to confirm this conjecture. The upper panel of  Figure 4 shows a 
scatterplot of genuine domestic saving in 1970 -1998 (the World Bank figures do not 
reach further back) and natural capital as measured before. The regression line 
through the 85 observations suggests that an increase of about two and a half 
percentage points in the natural capital share from one country to the next is 
associated with a decrease in genuine saving by one percent of GDP. The relationship 
is statistically significant (Spear man’s r = -0.53).
23 The correlation between genuine 
saving and natural capital in Figure 4a is closer than that between gross investment 
and natural capital in Figure 3a. On the other hand, the inverse relationship between 
net investment and natural capital (not shown) is weaker than the ones shown in 
Figures 3a and 4a, but still significant. This seems to suggest that it is not enough to 
adjust gross investment for depreciation of physical capital; we need to adjust it for 
depreciation of other types of capital as well.  
The lower panel of Figure 4 shows a scatterplot of economic growth and genuine 
domestic saving in 1970-1998 in the same 85 countries. The regression line suggests 
that an increase in the genuine saving rate by about seven percentage points i s 
associated with an increase in annual economic growth by 1 percentage point. The 
relationship is highly significant (Spearman’s  r = 0.72). Again, the correlation 
between genuine saving and growth in Figure 4b is closer than that between gross 
investment and growth in Figure 3b. Further, the direct relationship between 
economic growth and net investment (not shown) is weaker than the ones shown in 
                                                 
22 More specifically, genuine domestic saving is defined as net domestic saving plus education 
expenditure minus energy depletion, mineral depletion, net forest depletion and carbon dioxide damage 
(World Bank, 2000, p. 171). Estimates that are missing include the depletion and degradation of soils 
and net depletion of fish stocks. The most important pollutants affecting  human health and economic 
assets are also excluded (particulate emissions, ground -level ozone, acid rain). In some cases, the 
resource depletion estimates of the World Bank are quite high because the entire mineral -resource rent 
is counted as depletion whereas the alternative user cost approach allocates only a fraction of the rent to 
depletion. The median genuine saving rate in our sample is 9 percent, and ranges from  -21 percent to 
23 percent. The corresponding figures for the gross investment rate are 20 percent, 7 percent and 32 
percent.  
23 The correlation weakens a bit if we limit the regression to the 77 countries where the natural capital 
share is below 0.25, but it remains statistically significant (Spearman’s  r = -0.43).    27 
Figures 3b and 4b, but still highly significant. This suggests once more that it is not 
enough to adjust gross investment for physical depreciation. It seems that, in a broad 
sense, quality counts.  
 
6.3 Gross saving and growth 
The difference between gross investment and genuine saving comprises four terms: 
(a) depreciation of physical capital, (b) depreciation of  natural capital, (c) depreciation 
of human capital and (d) rundown of foreign capital  – the current account deficit. 
How much of the difference between the results reported in Figures 3 and 4 can be 
traced to the current account? To find out, we subtract the current account 
deficit/GDP ratio from the gross investment rate in order to obtain the gross domestic 
saving rate and then redraw the scatterplots.  
The upper panel of Figure 5 shows the scatterplot of gross domestic saving in 
1970-1998 and natural capital. The results are essentially the same as in Figure 4a, 
even if the correlation now is a bit weaker (Spearman’s r = -0.40). The lower panel of 
Figure 5 shows the scatterplot of economic growth and gross domestic saving in the 
same 85 countries. Again, the results are essentially the same as in Figure 4b 
(Spearman’s r = 0.73). The correlations between natural capital, gross saving and 
growth in Figure 5 are a bit stronger than the ones between natural capital, gross 
investment and growth in Figure 3, but the differences are small.  
To summarize, the data show that, across countries,  
(a)  economic growth varies directly with gross investment, genuine saving and 
gross saving (Figures 3b, 4b, and 5b),  
(b)  gross investment, genuine saving and gross saving are all i nversely related to 
resource dependence (Figures 3a, 4a, and 5a), and  
(c)  growth varies inversely with natural resource dependence  (Figure 1).  
Through any one of the three possible channels under review here (gross investment, 
genuine saving or gross saving), an increase in the share of natural capital in national  
wealth by 10 percentage points from one country to another is associated with a 
decrease in per capita economic growth by 0.5-0.6 percentage points. Natural resource 
dependence thus appears to inhibit economic growth significantly by weakening 
public and private incentives to save and invest as well as to build up human capital 
(Barro, 1997; Temple, 1999; Gylfason, 2001), in addition to the linkages through the 
Dutch disease, rent seeking, policy fai lures and institutional weaknesses stemming   28 
from a false sense of security, reviewed in Section 3. If so, the adverse effects of 
natural resource dependence on economic growth since the 1960s that have been 
reported in the literature may, in part, reflect the effect of investment and genuine 
saving on growth. 
At last, we look at the data on financial development. The upper panel of Figure 6 
below shows a cross-sectional scatterplot of financial development, for which we use 
the average ratio of M2 and GDP in 1965-1998 as a proxy, like King and Levine 
(1993), and natural resource dependence as measured before. The figure covers the 
same 85 countries as before. The lower panel of the figure relates our measure of 
financial development to average economic growt h per capita over the same period. 
Figure 6a shows a clear negative correlation between natural resource dependence and 
financial depth (Spearman’s r = -0.68).
24 Similarly, Figure 6b shows a positive 
relationship between our measure of financial depth and a verage economic growth 
(Spearman’s r = 0.66). However, the question of causality remains. It is possible that 
heavy dependence on natural resources actually hinders the development of the 
financial sector and hence also growth, as we are inclined to think,  but other 
possibilities also exist; in particular, some unspecified third factor may inhibit both 
financial development and economic growth.  
 
7. Regressions 
It remains to see if the statistical patterns reported in the preceding section hold up 
under closer scrutiny. The first three rows in Table 2 report seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) estimates of a system of three equations for the 85 countries in our 
sample where  
(a)  economic growth per capita depends on the share of gross domestic 
investment in GDP 1965-1998, the gross secondary-school enrolment rate, the 
natural capital share and the logarithm of initial per capita income (i.e., in 
1965), defined as purchasing-power-parity adjusted GNP per capita in 1998 
divided by an appropriate growth factor;  
(b)  the enrolment rate in turn depends on the natural capital share and initial 
income; and  
                                                 
24 The exponential regression curve becomes steeper if we limit the regression to the 77 countries 
where the natural capital share is below 0.25, but even so the correlation remains highly significant 
(Spearman’s r = -0.61).    29 
(c)  investment depends on the natural capital share.   
It is not our contention that earlier writers, including ourselves, have been misguided 
by their use of imperfect proxies for natural resource intensity. Even so, knowing that 
we could recount essentially the same story as we are about to tell here using the 
earlier proxies, we prefer here to use the World Bank’s natural capital estimates for 
the reason stated in Section 2. The recursive nature of the system shown in Table 2 
and the conceivable correlation of the error terms in the three equations make SUR an 
appropriate estimation procedure (Lahiri and Schmidt, 1978). In particular, this 
method produces unbiased, efficient  and consistent parameter estimates without any 
need to correct for simultaneity bias.
25  
 
Table 2. Regression results: Growth and gross investment 
Dependent 
variable 
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Note: 85 observations. t-statistics are shown within parentheses.  
 
All the parameter estimates in Table 2 are economically and statistically significant. 
The coefficient on initial income in the growth equation indicates a convergence 
speed of 1.5 percent per year, which is not far below the 2-3 percent range typically 
reported in statistical growth research. The direct effect of natural capital on growth is 
-0.06. The indirect effect of natural capital on growth through education is -0.75· 0.05 
»  -0.04 and the additional indirect effect through investment is  -0.20· 0.10 = -0.02. 
The novelty here is the part of the story involving investment; as far as we know, this 
linkage – from heavy dependence on natural resources to slow growth via investment 
                                                 
25 However, the fact that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the system (not shown) are almost 
the same as the SUR estimates shown in the table indicates that the correlation of error terms across 
equations is of minor consequence.   30 
– has not been documented in econometric work before. The total effect of natural 
capital on growth is thus about -0.12 (for given initial income), which is very close to 
the value of the slope of the regression line in Figure 1. This means that the implic it 
constraint on the coefficient of initial income as well as the omission of education and 
investment in Figure 1 do not bias the quasi -reduced-form estimate of the slope of the 
regression line in the figure. The bottom row in Table 2 shows the OLS estima te of 
the reduced-from equation for growth implied by the equation system above. Like 
Figure 1, Table 2 indicates that an increase in the natural capital share by eight or nine 
percentage points is associated with a decrease in growth by about one percentage 
point. Of the total effect of natural capital on growth, about a third can thus be 
attributed to education according to this interpretation, and about one-sixth to 
investment. This still leaves about a half of the total effect to be explained by other 
factors, perhaps the Dutch disease, rent seeking and policy failures.   
Notice that the positive coefficient of initial income in the enrolment equation 
shows that the significance of the enrolment variable in the growth equation is not just 
an indirect effect of low initial income. Higher income raises the enrolment rate which 
then raises the rate of growth, contrary to the convergence hypothesis. It thus appears 
that there is a relationship between growth and enrolment that is independent of the 
effect of initial income on enrolment. The results shown in Table 2 imply absolute as 
well as conditional convergence because the total effect of an increase in initial 
income on growth is -1.54 + 19.9· 0.05 »  -0.54 which is significantly negativ e in a 
Wald test (p = 0.00). Further, to be on guard against the possibility that the natural 
capital share may in fact be a proxy for the level of development, we added to our 
system an auxiliary regression of the natural capital share against a constant  as well as 
the logarithm of initial income. The effect of initial income on the natural capital 
share is significantly negative, with a coefficient of  -4.56 (with t = 4.6), but in other 
respects the estimation results are virtually identical to the ones sh own in Table 2. In 
this case, the total effect of an increase in initial income on growth is  -1.54 + 
20.0· 0.05 + 0.06· 4.56 »  -0.27 which is barely significantly negative in a Wald test 
(p = 0.045). Hence, when we take the statistical relationship between natural capital 
and initial income into account, the evidence for absolute convergence weakens 
considerably. When, on the other hand, we added initial income as a potential 
determinant of investment, in order to allow for the possibility that investment is   31 
lower at low levels of income than at higher levels (Chenery and Syrquin, 1975), the 
effect of initial income on investment turned out to be economically and statistically 
insignificant.   
The use of net investment instead of gross investment yields similar results that are 
significant throughout, but slightly less so than the ones shown in Table 2, especially 
the investment equation. When net investment and depreciation enter separately into 
the equation system, the coefficient on depreciation (0.24, with t = 3.9) in the growth 
equation is significantly larger than the coefficient on net investment (0.08, with t = 
2.9). Other parameter estimates remain virtually unchanged. Natural capital has a 
similar effect on depreciation as on net investment.
26 The depreciation of natural 
resources (energy, minerals, forest, carbon dioxide damage) is not significantly 
related to growth nor is the dependence on natural resources more likely to cause such 
depreciation.  
 
7.1 From gross investment to genuine saving 
Table 3 shows the results we get when we replace gross investment by genuine saving 
in our model, and can be interpreted in the same way. The results are essentially the 
same as the ones shown in Table 2 except there is a closer correlation between 
genuine saving and natural capital in Table 3 than there is between gross investment 
and natural capital in Table 2 (compare Figures 4a and 3a). The direct effect of natural 
capital on growth is again -0.06. The indirect effect through education is -0.82· 0.05 »  
-0.04. The further indirect effect through genuine saving is  -0.41· 0.08 »  -0.03, which 
is smaller than indicated by Figure 4 where education is absent. The total effect of 
natural capital on growth is thus about -0.13 (for given initial income). In this case, 
education explains a bit less than a third of the total effect and genuine saving a bit 
less than a fourth, which leaves almost a half to be explained by other factors.   
Genuine saving seems to contribute a bit more than gross investment to the total 
effect of natural capital on growth, even if the difference is not large. This was to be 
expected because, as noted before, genuine saving includes a correction for the 
depreciation of physical and natural capital as well as for improvement in human 
capital. Therefore, unlike the indirect effect of natural capital on growth through the 
volume of gross investment in Table 2, the indirect effect of natural capital on growth 
                                                 
26 Very similar results obtain when the eight countries with natural capital  shares above 0.25 are   32 
through genuine saving in Table 3 reflects the quality as well as quantity of physical, 
natural and human capital. For example, if increased natural resource dependence 
from one place to another reduces the quantity and quality of investment or if it 
reduces the quality of natural or human capital, then the ultimate effect of natural 
capital on growth will be larger, other things being the same. Even so, the refinement 
achieved by replacing gross investment by genuine saving in our empirical analysis, 
while statistically significant, is rather small. Gross investment even without 
adjustment for depreciation appears to be a significant and robust determinant of 
economic growth, as claimed by Scott (1989). 
 
Table 3. Regression results: Growth and genuine saving 
Dependent 
variable 
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Note: 85 observations. t-statistics are shown within parentheses.  
 
Table 4 shows the results we get when we try gross saving in our model rather than 
gross investment. We do this in order to assess the contribution of foreign saving to 
domestic growth. The direct effect of natural capital on growth is once again -0.06. 
The indirect effect through education is now -0.82· 0.04 »  -0.03. The further indirect 
effect through gross saving is -0.42· 0.09 »  -0.04, which, once again, is smaller than 
indicated by Figure 5 where education is absent. Thus, the total effect of natural 
capital on economic growth is still about -0.13 (for given initial inc ome). In this case, 
education explains a bit less than a fourth of the total effect and gross saving a bit less 
than a third, which still leaves almost a half to be explained by other factors as before.  
The results shown in Table 4 suggest that gross domestic saving has slightly more 
explanatory power (i.e., higher R
2) in our growth equation than gross domestic 
                                                                                                                                           
excluded from the analysis.      33 
investment on its own (Table 2). This means that, in our sample at least, persistent 
current account deficits do not seem to be good for growth. Also, when the current 
account deficit is added as a separate variable to the equation system presented in 
Table 4, this addition is not statistically significant in the growth equation; gross 
saving seems to suffice. These results seem to suggest that domestic investment 
matters for economic growth only insofar as it is financed by domestic saving. This 
finding is perhaps not as surprising as it might seem, however, in view of the 
prevalence of foreign borrowing by the government in many of the developing 
countries in our sample. Like foreign aid, foreign lending to many developing 
countries tends not to be repaid but rolled over. 
 
Table 4. Regression results: Growth and gross saving 
Dependent 
variable 
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Note: 85 observations. t-statistics are shown within parentheses.  
 
7.2 Economic growth and financial maturity 
This brings us to our last consideration in this paper: the role of the financial system. 
We showed in our model how growth depends on the productivity of capital. We also 
suggested that this might be affected by the state of the domestic financial system: A 
more advanced system would be likely to raise the productivity of capital  – for a 
given amount of capital – and hence also the rate of interest, saving and growth. This 
provides an indirect route between natural resources and economic growth if these 
thwart the development of the financial system.
27 
 
                                                 
27 Referring back to Table 1, we might add that the M2/GDP ratio is higher in the group of resource-
poor, high-growth countries in the north-east corner of the table than it is in the resource-rich, low-  34 
Table 5. Regression results: Growth and financial depth 
Dependent 
variable 
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Note: 85 observations. t-statistics are shown within parentheses.  
 
Rather than extend all the regression results from Tables 2 -4 to accommodate the 
financial depth variable, we focus on the case with gross saving, for the other two 
cases are quite similar. Table 5 shows the results we get when gross saving depends 
on natural capital as well as on the logarithm of the M 2/GDP ratio, which in turn 
depends on natural capital.
28 Apart from the addition of the financial depth variable to 
the system of equations, the results are quite similar as in Table 4. What is new is this: 
natural capital now influences growth through four distinct channels: d irectly (-0.06), 
through education (-0.90· 0.04 »  -0.04), through gross saving (-0.26· 0.09 »  -0.02), 
and through financial depth via gross saving ( -0.03· 4.95· 0.09 »  -0.01). In sum, the 
total effect of natural capital on growth is -0.13 as before.  
When the gross saving rate and the logarithm of the M 2/GDP ratio enter the growth 
equation as a multiple, the estimated coefficient remains highly significant, indicating 
that the effect of gross saving on economic growth varies directly with the maturity of 
the financial system. However, we find no clear evidence of our earlier conjecture that 
the contribution of foreign saving to economic growth varies systematically with 
financial maturity as measured here.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
growth group in the south-west corner, or 47 percent compared with 16 percent.  
28 In our sample, the M2/GDP ratio varies inversely with inflation, measured as the inflation distortion 
p /(1+p ) where p  is the average inflation rate from 1965 to 1998. When we purge the M2/GDP ratio of 
its inflation-related component and re-estimate the system, we obtain similar results as in Table 5.       35 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a linkage between natural resources and economic 
growth, through saving and investment. When the share of output that accrues to the 
owners of natural resources rises, the demand for capital falls – and this leads to lower 
real interest rates, less saving and less rapid growth. However, economic and 
institutional reforms paving the way to a more efficient allocation of capital may 
enhance the quantity as well as the quality of  new investment and sustain growth.  
We have extended a well-known endogenous growth model to include natural 
resources as an input into the production of final goods. The model implies that the 
larger the share of natural capital in national income, the lo wer is the rate of growth of 
consumption and the greater is the need for measures to spur investment. Finally, the 
more productive the capital stock, the higher is the rate of growth.  
Using a data set recently released by the World Bank (2000) we calculat ed 
correlations between growth (adjusted for initial income), the share of natural capital 
in total wealth and saving and investment. The results can be summarized as follows:  
•   Investment in physical capital is inversely related to the share of natural capi tal in 
national wealth and directly related to the development of the financial system.   
•   The development of the financial system  – measured by the ratio of M2 to GDP – is 
also inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth.  
•   The secondary-school enrolment rate – which is our measure of education – is 
inversely related to the natural capital share.  
•   Economic growth is inversely related to natural resource abundance as well as to 
initial income and directly related to the level of educatio n and investment.  
In addition, we found that foreign saving – in the form of current account deficits – 
was inversely correlated with growth. Even if investment financed by domestic saving 
is good for growth this does not seem to apply to investment financed by foreign 
saving.  
We conclude that economic and structural reforms leading to more efficient capital 
markets, increased investment and a better allocation of capital across sectors may 
help start growth in countries that are well endowed in terms of natural resources. An 
excessive dependence on natural resources may,  ceteris paribus, stifle the 
development of efficient capital markets. Even so, active measures to construct an   36 
institutional environment that contributes to saving and high -quality investment may 
ensure growth and enhance welfare in the presence of abundant natural resources.     37 
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Argentina  6.7  23  56  11  22  16  0.4  11728  -1.6 
Australia  11.9  24  86  9  23  46  1.7  21795  -0.2 
Austria  2.6  24  92  18  26  71  2.6  23145  0.6 
Bangladesh  14.1  20  18  2  10  20  1.4  1407  -2.0 
Belgium  0.0  20  97  15  20  64  2.3  23622  0.4 
Benin  7.7  15  12  0  4  19  0.1  857  -3.3 
Botswana  6.3  27  26  23  35  20  7.7  5796  4.0 
Brazil  7.9  21  33  14  21  17  2.2  6460  -0.4 
Burkina Faso  16.9  21  3  -2  3  15  0.9  866  -2.7 
Burundi  19.9  12  3  -5  1  14  0.9  561  -2.9 
Cameroon  21.1  21  17  9  20  17  1.3  1395  -2.1 
Canada  11.1  22  87  12  23  45  1.8  22814  0.0 
Central 
African Rep.  30.2  10  10  -1  2  17  -1.2  1098  -4.2 
Chad  37.1  7  5  -5  -1  11  -0.6  843  -3.9 
Chile  9.8  19  55  3  20  25  1.9  8507  -0.5 
China  7.2  31  45  16  35  65  6.8  3051  2.9 
Colombia  7.2  19  40  9  20  16  2  5861  -0.7 
Congo  14.5  32  50  1  23  17  1.4  846  -2.3 
Costa Rica  8.2  21  40  16  21  32  1.2  5812  -1.3 
Côte D’Ivoire   18.0  17  16  19  21  27  -0.8  1484  -3.7 
Denmark  3.8  23  101  15  23  49  1.9  23855  0.1 
Dominican 
Rep.  12.4  21  35  9  15  21  2.3  4337  -0.6 
Ecuador  17.0  19  43  4  22  20  1.8  3003  -1.2 
Egypt  4.5  21  52  0  14  60  3.5  3146  0.2 
El Salvador  2.8  16  24  3  9  29  -0.4  4008  -2.8 
Finland  6.6  24  102  16  26  46  2.4  20641  0.4 
France  2.7  22  86  15  23  55  2.1  21214  0.2 
Gambia, The  11.8  20  13  -6  5  22  0.4  1428  -2.8 
Ghana  7.2  12  31  1  8  17  -0.8  1735  -3.6 
Greece  3.7  25  80  11  17  42  2.4  13994  0.2 
Guatemala  3.3  14  16  3  11  21  0.7  3474  -2.0 
Guinea-Bissau  44.2  29  6  -5  -2  14  -0.1  573  -3.7 
Haiti  6.7  11  13  -6  3  24  -0.8  1379  -3.8 
Honduras  9.9  20  22  13  17  24  0.6  2338  -2.3 
India  19.8  19  34  8  20  32  2.7  2060  -0.7 
Indonesia  12.4  26  31  10  29  22  4.7  2407  1.0 
Ireland  8.1  21  90  16  21  52  3  17991  0.8 
Italy  1.3  22  72  15  23  64  2.5  20365  0.5 
Jamaica  6.8  25  58  7  20  36  -0.4  3344  -2.9 
Japan  0.8  31  92  22  33  91  3.5  23592  1.4 
Jordan  1.6  29  48  -7  -4  79  -0.4  2615  -3.1 
Kenya  9.4  17  17  9  17  29  1.3  964  -2.3 
Korea  1.7  29  72  21  29  31  6.6  13286  3.6 
Madagascar  41.9  11  15  0  4  17  -1.8  741  -4.9 
Malawi  11.8  17  6  5  11  19  0.5  551  -3.2 
Malaysia  8.6  28  48  19  34  53  4.1  7699  1.2 
Mali  41.0  18  7  0  3  18  -0.1  673  -3.6 
Mauritania  21.6  20  9  -21  4  16  -0.1  1500  -3.2 
Mauritius  1.2  22  45  16  21  46  3.8  8236  1.0 
Mexico  5.9  20  43  7  23  20  1.5  7450  -0.9 
Morocco  4.1  20  26  8  14  42  1.8  3188  -1.2 
Mozambique  12.7  13  5  -12  -9  26  0.5  740  -3.1 
Namibia  10.1  19  52  -5  12  33  0.7  5280  -1.8 
Nepal  17.7  18  22  0  10  22  1.1  1181  -2.3 
Netherlands  1.5  22  99  18  25  69  1.9  22325  0.0 
New Zealand  18.5  22  87  18  22  41  0.7  16084  -1.1 
Nicaragua  13.9  20  34  0  6  25  -3.3  1896  -5.6 
Niger  54.2  11  4  0  6  12  -2.5  729  -5.5 
Norway  10.0  27  94  17  31  51  3  26196  1.0 
Pakistan  5.6  16  16  0  9  40  2.7  1652  -0.8 
Panama  6.5  20  55  21  23  37  0.7  4925  -1.8 
Papua New 
Guinea  19.3  23  11  -1  18  31  0.5  2205  -2.4 
Paraguay  11.5  21  26  12  19  19  2.3  4312  -0.6 
Peru  7.8  21  53  8  20  17  -0.3  4180  -2.7 
Philippines   6.2  22  62  10  21  28  0.9  3725  -1.8 
Portugal  2.3  27  59  15  19  85  3.2  14569  0.8 
Rwanda  21.7  13  5  -6  2  14  0  650  -3.6 
Senegal  16.8  12  12  1  6  22  -0.4  1297  -3.5 
Sierra Leone  28.0  7  13  -3  8  14  -1.6  445  -5.1 
South Africa  5.0  22  62  4  21  53  0.1  8296  -2.0 
Spain  2.9  23  84  13  22  72  2.3  15960  0.2 
Sri Lanka  7.4  22  57  9  14  26  3  2945  -0.3 
Sweden  5.6  20  91  15  21  52  1.4  19848  -0.5 
Switzerland  0.9  25  85  20  27  108  1.2  26876  -0.4 
Thailand  6.5  29  29  20  28  47  5  5524  1.7   42 
Togo  15.2  17  20  10  16  27  -0.6  1352  -3.6 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  9.5  21  62  -2  28  35  2.6  7208  -0.1 
Tunisia  7.9  26  34  11  23  40  2.7  5169  -0.2 
Turkey  5.0  19  37  11  16  21  2.1  6594  -0.5 
United 
Kingdom  1.9  18  88  9  17  72  1.9  20314  0.0 
United States  4.1  18  91  8  18  63  1.6  29240  -0.1 
Uruguay  11.6  14  67  9  16  32  1.2  8541  -1.1 
Venezuela  18.9  22  33  -2  30  25  -0.8  5706  -3.0 
Zambia  37.8  18  17  -2  19  23  -2  678  -5.2 
Zimbabwe  8.5  17  26  12  17  21  0.5  2489  -2.4 
Source: World Bank (2000). The ratio of money and quasi-money to GDP for eight of the industrial countries in the sample is 
taken from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.  




Gross domestic saving is calculated as the difference between GDP and public and 
private consumption. 
 
Net domestic saving is equal to gross domestic saving less the value of consumption 
of fixed capital. 
 
Physical depreciation (consumption of fixed capital) represents the replacement value 
of capital used up in the process of production. 
 
Depreciation of human capital is measured by education expenditure which refers to 
the current operating expenditures on education, including wages and salaries and 
excluding capital investments in buildings and equipment.  
 
Energy depletion is equal to the product of unit resource rents and the physical 
quantities of energy extracted. It covers crude oil, natural gas and coal. 
 
Mineral depletion is equal to the product of unit resource rents and the physical 
quantities of minerals extracted. It refers to bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, 
phosphate, tin, gold and silver. 
 
Net forest depletion is calculated as the product of unit resource rents and the excess 
of roundwood harvest over natural growth. 
 
Carbon dioxide damage is estimated to be $20 per tonne of carbon times the number 
of tons of carbon emitted.  
 
Genuine domestic saving is equal to net domestic saving, plus education expenditure 
and minus energy depletion, mineral depletion, net forest depletion and carbon 
dioxide damage. 
 
Source: World Bank (2000), page 171. 
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Figure 1. Economic growth and natural capital
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Figure 2. Natural resource abundance  
and economic structure 
Resource poor, 
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Figure 3a. Investment and natural capital
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Figure 3b. Economic growth and investment
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Figure 4a. Genuine saving and natural capital
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Figure 4b. Economic growth and genuine saving
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Figure 5a. Gross saving and natural capital
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Figure 5b. Economic growth and gross saving
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Figure 6b. Economic growth and financial depth
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